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Abstract: This chapter briefly reviews the role of race (as a concept) in the 
history of theorizing the posthuman, engages with existing discussions of 
race as technology, and explores the significance of understanding race as 
technology for the field of posthumanism. Our aim is to engage existing 
literature that posits racialized individuals as posthumans and to consider 
how studying race might inform theories of the posthuman. 
 




Examining the role of race in the field of posthumanism is a bit like examining 
race in the genre of science fiction. Science fiction tends to reconstitute what 
we imagine as race into other forms of exclusion and oppression. When 
reading or watching science fiction, one often finds cyborgs, genetically altered 
people, and aliens of various sorts treated as subhumans and second-class 
citizens, feared for their unfamiliar and incompatible customs, laws, and 
worldviews. It might be said, accordingly, that science fiction anticipates a 
future beyond race, at least as we experience race today. But it might also be 
that science fiction gives us another important insight into the role of race in 
relation to (post)humanism: race, in the form of exclusion and oppression 
justified by perceptions of fixed bodily and cultural difference, continues to 
play a fundamental role in the societies imagined within science fiction 
because race is and has been one of the most influential technologies to 
emerge worldwide since the 1500s. As with other paradigm-shifting 
technologies, race has, in a very material sense, altered our ability to imagine 
and understand what it means to be—and not to be—(post)human. While 
such imaginings are not of race, per se, the technologies of race both 
contextualize and inform them. Likewise, when examining the field of 
posthumanism, race as such is not often discussed, yet concerns regarding the 
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technologies of race—their function and effects—are often front and center 
when scholars imagine what humans are, are not, and might become.  
 
Our strategy, then, is to identify the role of race—as technology—in the field 
of posthumanism, even when it might seem that posthumanism (like science 
fiction) anticipates a future beyond race. Some scholars of posthumanism have 
suggested that new forms of bodily and environmental Otherness will 
supersede, and perhaps even erase, the influence and relevance of race for 
societies as we move forward into the Anthropocene. This may be. But even so, 
it seems likely that race as technology will continue to shape the societies of 
the future. As such, those who have been subjected to the most debilitating and 
exploitative technologies of race have the most to teach us about what one 
must learn to do—and imagine—in order to survive in an increasingly 
precarious world created, quite literally, by (if not for) humanity. 
 
 
EUGENICS, CYBORGS, AND THE POSTHUMAN 
 
The figure of the posthuman first appears as part of an objection to eugenics 
as a feasible means of preventing or alleviating poverty. For the eugenicist, 
science and technology are a means to transform human beings into 
something that is "more completely human" (Titmuss and Lafitte 1942, 106). 
Science and technology are a means, in particular, for either preventing the 
birth of those who are intrinsically incapable of social success or else altering 
intrinsic traits—relating, for example, to efficiency and thrift—in ways that 
enhance suitability for productive labor. 
 
There are strong (and persuasive) moral objections to the eugenic approach 
to poverty. But there are technoscientific and economic objections as well. The 
posthuman makes its appearance in this latter variety of objection.1 
 
[I]t is inconceivable that human nature could be changed to the extent 
that is contemplated by [the eugenicist's] theory of perfectibility. Such 
changes would bring into being an animal no longer human, or for that 
matter mammalian, in its character, for it would involve the elimination 
of such fundamental human and mammalian instincts and emotions as 
anger, jealousy, fear, etc. But even if such a post-human animal did 
come into existence, it is difficult to believe that it could carry on the 
necessary economic activities without using a certain amount of formal 
organization, compulsion, etc (Parmelee 1916, 319). 
 
 
1 We thank Andres Pilsch for identifying this appearance. 
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The posthuman, so conceived, is the human shorn of human instinct and 
emotion. Since, according to the objection, these characteristics are necessary 
for motivating effortful work in the absence of external coercion, the 
posthuman, so conceived, escapes poverty only at the expense of individual 
liberty.2 
 
The eugenic conception of the posthuman stands opposed to the 
Enlightenment ideal of the human. The complete human, on the 
Enlightenment ideal, is a sovereign self. He—and, historically, the ideal human 
is male—exercises sovereignty through individual liberty of choice; he 
realizes this liberty by subordinating instinct and emotion to reason and 
rationality; and he uses this liberty to achieve material and social progress, 
subjecting the chaos of nature, the constraints of biology, and the bonds of 
tradition to scientific evidence, technological innovation, and rational critique. 
Insofar as a posthuman society achieves progress only at the expense of 
individual liberty, the eugenicist, with his preference for the posthuman over 
the human, stands for domination and subjugation. 
 
Contrast this original conception of the posthuman with more recent 
conceptions of the posthuman as cyborg (see Hayles 1999; Thweatt-Bates 
2012; Braidotti 2013). The cyborg, in these conceptions, is  
 
a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of 
social reality as well as a creature of fiction (Haraway 1985, 65). 
 
As social reality, the cyborg is a political construction, a product of social 
relations that liberate some and oppress others. As creature of fiction, the 
construction is contingent and therefore malleable, its nature illusory, its 
dispositions and capacities limited only by imagination (and, perhaps, the 
power to transform the imagined into reality). The cyborg is, in some sense, 
the enlightenment ideal of the complete human made real, "an ultimate self 
untied at last from all dependency" (Haraway 1985, 67). So, too, is the 
posthuman conceived as cyborg. For insofar as cybernetization makes the 
human more completely human, the posthuman is likewise untied from all 
dependency, a sovereign self perfected through fiction-making and social 
construction. 
 
Eugenic and cyborg conceptions of the posthuman agree that the posthuman 
is a "more complete" successor to the human. Both agree, as well, that some 
sort of technology—be it biological/genetic or bionic/engineered—is the 
 
2 Miah attributes to Fukuyama (2002) a similar conception of the posthuman, according to 
which biotechnological modifications capable of transforming humans into posthumans 
threaten to corrupt some essential factor of humanity (Miah 2008, 78). 
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source of whatever enhancement transforms humans into posthumans. The 
conceptions disagree, however, about whether technology affords such 
enhancement by excising or integrating with human characteristics. They 
thereby also disagree about whether human and mammalian nature is an 
obstacle or a foundation for human enhancement, and about whether 
posthuman-inducing enhancements position social progress and individual 
liberty as oppositional or complementary. 
 
 
RACE AS TECHNOLOGY 
 
Set aside the contrasts among eugenic and cyborg conceptions of the 
posthuman. Focus, instead, on a motivation common to both conceptions, 
namely, a concern with the place of racialized persons in society. Eugenicists 
of the early 20th century, especially in the United States and Germany, 
endorsed—and often saw enacted—policies and programs to control or 
decimate specific racial populations, for the sake of alleviating social ills such 
as poverty and criminality. Late 20th and early 21st century cyborg theorists 
of the posthuman, by contrast, typically advocate for the liberation of those 
same populations, for the sake of alleviating race-based injustice and 
oppression. Despite their different aims and attitudes, however, eugenicists 
and cyborg theorists connect—if only implicitly—the posthuman to issues of 
race. 
 
For the past decade, a growing number of scholars of race, working in fields 
such as Philosophy, Gender Studies, Media Studies, Literary Theory, and 
Sociology, have been developing a framework that deepens the connection 
between race and posthumanism. Sheth (2009), Chen (2009), and Coleman 
(2009)—among other works—argue for the benefits of theorizing race as a 
technology. This approach to race posits that certain social practices and 
institutions function as technologies of race; that these technologies create 
and sustain hierarchies of racial classification; and that individuals are 
racialized by virtue of how technologies of race rank them within such 
hierarchies (see Jones and Jones 2017). Insofar as posthumans arise through 
the technological transformation of humans, and given that technologies of 
race are ubiquitous in modern societies, theorizing race as technology 
promises that understanding how race works should illuminate what it is to 
be posthuman. 
 
Sheth (2009) offers, to date, the most extensive and systematic approach to 
theorizing race as technology. Sheth argues that those who wield sovereign 
power create and put into use technologies of race. She argues, further, that 
these technologies have three basic functions: first, to "channel an element 
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that is perceived as threatening to the political order into a set of [racial] 
classifications;" second, to "transfo[m the] 'unruly' into a set of 'naturalized' 
criteria upon which race is grounded;" and third, to "concea[l] our relationship 
to law and sovereign power as one of vulnerability and violence, such that 
racialized populations stand precariously close to being cast outside the gates 
of the city" (Sheth 2009, 8). 
 
We can better understand how race works as a technology—and, in particular, 
how technologies of race assign the social ills of a society to a particular 
population and then essentialize members of that population as constituting a 
race—by imagining a small town in Alabama. Imagine that the town's 
population generally opposes the use of local tax revenues (in the form of 
vouchers) for private schools. While some families like the idea--there's a 
small private Catholic school they'd like to send their kids to if the tuition was 
substantially lower—the majority oppose it. 
 
Imagine, now, that several new families move to town when the local sock 
company opens a third shift. These families have relocated from Florida. And 
while these families are not all related to one another, most of them are 
Catholic. These new families would like to send their children to the local 
private Catholic school but can't afford it. However, if they combine their 
support of a proposed voucher system to the minority of families already in 
favor of it, a new political landscape emerges. Suddenly there's a majority--
slim, perhaps--that favors the creation of a new school voucher system that 
would enable these Catholic families to send their kids to the local private 
school. 
 
This is where the technologies of race can start to do their work. If those in 
charge of the local school board can get the people of the town to view the 
school voucher system as un-Alabamian--a social practice that threatens the 
identity of the town--they could sway public opinion back to the way it was. It 
might benefit these leaders of the school board if, along the way, those who 
posed the threat to the status quo (those families that moved in) were treated 
as perpetual outsiders so that the locals would continue to shun whatever 
political agenda these families might support or even propose. If successful, 
those leaders of the town who wield sovereign power will encourage the local 
population to see these Floridian families as possessing certain traits--being 
irrational, dangerous, threatening—incapable of becoming Alabamians—and 
these come to be associated with their "racial" identity. They are Floridians 
and always will be. 
 
Once a racialized population comes to be seen as possessing undesirable and 
threatening traits—and these traits are determined be to the cause of other 
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social ills—those who wield the technologies of race can, if unchallenged, 
maintain their power indefinitely. Like many other modern technologies, the 
technologies of race are fluid, always changing, responding to whatever 
political threat the status quo (i.e., those with sovereign power who serve as 
the technicians of race) might face. As new threats to the political status quo 
emerge, race as technology adapts, not only preventing whatever targeted 
population has been radicalized from ever joining the body politic, but also 
condemning these populations to the status of perpetual precarity, possessing 
traits that condemn them to the status of outsider and Other.  
 
In short, race is a technology designed to enable those who wield sovereign 
power to maintain it. And the effects of racialization on raced populations is 
quite simply devastating. But what’s so maddening for those of us seeking 
points of intervention into the politics of racialization is that race (as a 
technology) is so good, so smart, so adaptive, that it conceals not only it 
techniques but also the cognitive contradictions that result as it works over 
time. Race might essentialize a quality or trait to a certain population at one 
point and then it can essentialize an oppositional quality within the same 
population at a later date and the technology conceals itself in such a way that 
people who use it are conditioned not to notice. The technologies of race 
employed in the 1860s can essentialize slaves in the American South as crafty, 
sneaky, always plotting their escape, dangerous to all white people who may 
at any time face armed rebellion and/or attack. And then 50 years later these 
same technologies can essentialize the opposite: now black Southerners are 
racialized to be categorically ignorant, incapable of self -reflection and 
awareness, and so must be prevented (via Jim Crowe laws) from participating 
in community governance. 
 
The whole premise of race--and the essentialism it creates—is that these traits 
are supposed to be fixed, unchanging. And yet 50 years can pass and black 
Southerners are still black but their essential traits have changed while at the 
same time the very notion of blackness—of having a fixed, biological essence-
-remains. Race as a technology is so very good at maintaining the status quo 
that we, as the members of a society that heavily utilizes the technology, are 
trained to not notice, to not see the techniques by which it functions. 
 
 
ARE RACIALIZED INDIVIDUALS POSTHUMAN? 
 
Technologies of race create and sustain hierarchies of racial classification, and 
they racialize individuals by attaching to them a rank within some socially 
salient racial hierarchy. Those who wield sovereign power are thereby 
transformed into members of a superior race. Those who threaten sovereign 
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power, or who are perceived or positioned as threatening that power, by 
contrast, are transformed into members of a subordinate race. Insofar as 
posthumans are humans transformed by technology, theorizing race as 
technology seems to entail that racialized individuals are posthuman by 
default, always already transformed beyond the (merely) human by virtue of 
living in a racialized society.  
 
But matters are not quite so straightforward. Whether the entailment holds 
depends upon whether racialized individuals qualify as antecedently human. 
Insofar as posthumans are "more complete" humans, whether the entailment 
holds also depends upon whether those who qualify as human are capable of 
becoming more complete. If racialized individuals are not antecedently human, 
they cannot have their humanity transformed and so cannot be posthuman. 
But even if they are antecedently human, if their humanity cannot be 
transformed into the more completely human, they cannot be posthuman 
either. 
 
Societies influenced by modern European culture, whether through ancestry 
or colonization, offer conceptual resources that support conflicting answers to 
the question of whether racialized individuals are posthuman. Consider, first, 
that such societies tend to be familiar with the European Enlightenment's ideal 
of the human, according to which humans are complete insofar as, and to the 
extent that, their choices and behaviors exercise or enact sovereign power—
power free from the tethers of history and the restrictions that attend 
dependence upon others. This ideal, together with the posit that race is a 
technology, seem to entail, on the one hand, that those racialized as superior 
are posthuman because technologies of race enhance their sovereignty. But 
the enlightenment ideal, and the posit of race as technology, also seem to entail, 
on the other hand, that those racialized as subordinate are not posthuman 
because they lack sovereignty and thereby cannot become more completely 
human. (It is, accordingly, perhaps unsurprising that periods in which the 
Enlightenment ideal of the human holds sway are periods in which those 
racialized as subordinate are considered to be less than human.) 
 
In contrast to the Enlightenment-oriented approach to the posthuman, 
consider, second, the approach prominent in the popular culture of societies 
influenced by modern European culture. This approach tends to depict 
some—but certainly not all—posthumans as subordinately racialized 
individuals. 3  Popular examples of cyborgs depicted as subordinately 
racialized include Cyborg (Vic Stone) from DC Comics, Darth Maul in the Clone 
 
3 We note an irony here. If those racialized as subordinate are always already posthuman, the 
eugenic motivation for creating posthumans—namely, fear of unruly races—is itself sufficient 
for creating posthumans. 
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Wars era of the Star Wars sage, Baxter Stockman from Teenage Mutant Ninja 
Turtles, and the protagonists in Octavia Butler's Xenogenesis (1989). González 
(1995) notes, as further evidence of this tendency, that the language used in 
popular culture to describe cyborgs often resembles the language used to 
describe mixed-race persons. Nishime (2005) argues, as well, that modern 
cinema, by displacing issues about race onto narratives about cyborgs, tends 
to suppose that being racialized as subordinate is constitute of being a cyborg. 
 
Enlightenment-oriented and popular culture-inspired approaches to the 
posthuman agree that nothing prevents those who are racialized as superior 
from qualifying as posthuman. They disagree, however, about whether an 
apparent lack of sovereignty disqualifies those who are racialized as 
subordinate from being posthuman. There are, accordingly, and in the context 
of theorizing race as technology, three options for resolving the issue of 
whether those racialized as subordinate are posthuman. The first is to endorse 
the Enlightenment ideal of the complete human and yet deny that being 
racialized as subordinate forestalls exercises of sovereignty. The second is to 
endorse the Enlightenment ideal of the complete human and concede that 
subordinately racialized individuals are not posthuman. The third, finally, is to 
reject the Enlightenment ideal and work to construct an alternative whereby 
being racialized as subordinate is no obstacle to being (or becoming) more 
completely human.  
 
The first of these options has its origins in Haraway's (1985) early work on 
cyborgs. The strategy here is to acknowledge that the Enlightenment ideal of 
the human is racist while simultaneously maintaining that all racialized 
individuals attain that ideal. This involves theorizing that fiction-making and 
social construction work in ways that give sovereignty to those racialized as 
subordinate. Endorsing the Enlightenment ideal of the complete human, while 
denying that racialization as subordinate forestalls exercises of sovereignty, 
offers an ironic approach to the posthuman. The approach endorses a racist 
ideal of the complete human, condemns its racist fallout, and optimistically 
maintains that reconceptualizing subordinately racialized individuals as 
cyborgs somehow liberates them from that fallout. But, as Aguilar Garciá 
(2008) notes, this approach "does not specify in what way or why the 
communion with the inorganic is a sort of upheaval for the oppressed" 
(translated and quoted in Sued 2018, 97). Moreover, the imagining of ethno-
cyborgs whose technological prostheses rebel against their bodies and 
threaten violence to others demonstrates that being a (subordinately 
racialized) mestiza/o cyborg does not, in and of itself, entail being a human 
who is made more complete through integration with a technology, especially 
when the technology at issue is race (see Pitman 2016, 224). 
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Critical race theory lends support to the second option for resolving the issue 
of whether those racialized as subordinate are posthuman. Prior to the rise of 
posthuman theorizing, structural asymmetries in power relations between 
those racialized as superior and those racialized as subordinate fostered social 
and political divisions between those treated as "human" and those treated as 
"other," with "human" typically reserved for those who are white, and "other" 
typically reserved for those who are not (see Wynter 2003, 281-282). 
Posthumanist theory, similarly, at least on the Enlightenment-oriented 
approach, reproduces this same division—albeit reconceptualized as a 
division between those who are "posthuman" (white) and not (see Ali 2017). 
Whence Forlano notes, 
 
From the perspective of critical race studies, it is not productive to 
speak of the posthuman when so many people—non-white, less 
privileged/powerful, female, older, indigenous, people with disabilities, 
and so on—have not been historically included in the category of the 
human in the first place (Forlano 2017, 28). 
 
Since the historical record shows that those racialized as subordinate also tend 
to be classified and treated as less than human, the argument goes, and since 
the posthuman is inextricably tied to this history, there is no conceptual space 
or practical use for positing subordinately racialized posthumans. Better, 
perhaps, to focus, instead, on the shifting boundaries between human and 
nonhuman—and for those concerned with issues of race to ally themselves 
with theorists in animal studies rather than with posthumanists (see 
Livingston and Puar 2011; Jackson 2013). 
 
Those who pursue the third option for resolving the issue of whether those 
racialized as subordinate are posthuman tend to abstain from positing a 
univocal ideal of the human. They tend to prefer, instead, instead a more 
fragmental approach whereby the many ways of being human—and so of 
being more completely human—need not point toward a notion of humanity 
that is common to all. Braidotti, for example, maintains that  
 
the posthuman – a figuration carried by a specific cartographic reading 
of present discursive conditions – can be put to the collective task of 
constructing new subjects of knowledge, through immanent 
assemblages or transversal alliances between multiple actors (2019, 
36) 
 
In place of a unitary ideal that unites differently racialized humans as humans, 
Braidotti prefers assemblages and alliances that construct new meanings of 
what it is to be (completely) human. Siddiqui (2016), similarly, proposes 
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expanding conceptions of the human in ways that include those who have 






Despite her earlier preference for an ironic posthumanism, Haraway now 
prefers to focus on animal studies and rejects the posthuman approach. 
According to Haraway's more recent thinking, the notion of posthumanism 
 
is much too easily appropriated by the blissed-out, ‘Let’s all be 
posthumanists  and find our next teleological evolutionary stage in 
some kind of transhumanist technoenhancement’. Posthumanism is 
too easily appropriated to those kinds of projects for my taste (as 
quoted in Gade 2006, 140). 
 
Haraway concedes, however, that more critical approaches to the posthuman 
are possible, citing Hayles (1999) as an example. There are, moreover, some 
efforts to put a critical conceptual of the posthuman to work in ways that help 
to further theorizing about race and racialization. By theorizing that people 
racialized as subordinate qualify as posthuman, these efforts point toward 
fruitful associations between what we know about the lives of subordinately 
racialized populations and what we might expect for the lives of those living 
as posthumans more broadly. 
 
Consider, for example, an especially salient characteristic of contemporary life, 
namely, its extreme precarity. Ours is the era of the Anthropocene, when 
human impacts upon the natural environment mean that the conditions 
necessary for life as we have known it are no longer givens. Posthumanists 
tend to treat anthropogenic impacts as one (among several) fundamental 
motivations to theorize ourselves as posthuman (see Eroukhmanoff and 
Harker 2017; Propen 2018). Whence Braidotti conceptualizes posthuman 
theory as 
 
a generative tool to help us re-think the basic unit of reference for the 
human in the bio-genetic age known as ‘anthropocene’, the historical 
moment when the Human has become a geological force capable of 
affecting all life on this planet (2013, 5). 
Ferrando (2016), similarly, ascribes responsibility for the negative impacts on 
the environment to an anthropocentric worldview, arguing that addressing 
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these impacts requires decentering the “human” and, instead, centering the 
“posthuman.”4 
 
Absent from many posthumanist approaches to the Anthropocene, however, 
is attention to issues of race—such as how anthropogenic changes to the 
environment differentially impact racialized populations, and what differently 
racialized populations of posthumans might contribute to responding to those 
changes. This is, perhaps, part of a larger tendency to neglect the racial 
dimensions of environmental change (see Vergès 2017, Tuana 2019). But the 
absence is surprising nonetheless. For, as Gergan, Smith, and Vasudevan 
(forthcoming) argue, fictionalized narratives about apocalyptic futures for the 
Anthropocene tend to act as proxies for fears of racialized “others” and the 
decline of racial supremacies. 
 
Posthumanists concerned with the Anthropocene ought not neglect issues of 
race. Subordinately racialized populations—American chattel slaves, Jewish 
persons from the Holocaust, Muslims targeted as extremists, Latina/o 
migrants at the United States border, to name some obvious examples—have 
much to teach about surviving times of despair, when conditions for 
sustainable living are out of reach and forces abound that threaten to 
overwhelm efforts to change course. Mary Annaïse Heglar, for example, 
connects the Anthropocene and race through the lens of existential threat. She 
argues that, far from being a unique threat to human existence, the changing 
climate of the Anthropocene is akin to the changing environment for Black 
people through the history of the United States. 
 
I’ll grant that we’ve never seen an existential threat to all of humankind 
before. It’s true that the planet itself has never become hostile to our 
collective existence. But history is littered with targeted—but no less 
deadly—existential threats for specific populations. 
 
For 400 years and counting, the United States itself has been an 
existential threat for Black people. Let’s be clear that slavery didn’t end 
with freedom; it just morphed into a marginally more sophisticated, still 
deadly machine (Heglar 2019). 
 
We should expect, therefore, that the strategies Black people in the United 
States have been using to survive in a hostile environment will prove to be 
relevant for devising strategies survive anthropogenic climate change.5 If the 
 
4 Ahuja 2017 notes, as well, that posthumanists are comparatively more concerned with the 
extinction of nonhuman species than theorists of animal studies. 
5 Insofar as surviving climate change involves adapting strategies from those who have been 
racialized as subordinate, it is, perhaps, unsurprising to find that people more invested in 
 12 
posthuman is a vehicle for imagining how to survive the Anthropocene, 
posthumanists would do well to imagine the paradigmatic posthuman as a 
subordinately racialized individual. They would do well, also, to turn their 
attention from fictionalized utopias and imagined alternative history, toward 
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